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AETNA BLDG. MAINTENANCE Co. v. WEST
[L. A. No. 21876.

In Bank.

[39 C.2d

July 8, 1952.]

AETNA BUILDING MAINTENANCE COMPANY, INC.,
Respondent, v. JAMES A. WEST, Appellant.
[1] Injunctions-Soliciting Customers of Former Employer.-In
the absence of an enforceable contract containing covenants
to the contrary, equity will not enjoin a former employee
from soliciting business from his former employer's customers, provided his competition is fairly and legally conducted.
[2] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Right to Engage
in Occupations.-An employee has the right to advise his
employer's customers that he is severing his business relations with the employer and engaging in business for himself.
[3] Words and Phrases-"Solicit."-Term "solicit" implies personal petition and importunity addressed to a particular individual to do some particular thing.
[4] Id.-"Solicitation."-Merely informing customers of one's former employer of a change of employment, without more, is
not "solicitation."
[5] Id.-"Solicitation."-Willingness to discuss business on invitation of another party does not constitute "solicitation" on
the part of the invitee.
[6] Injunctions-Receiving Business From Customers of Former
Employer.-Equity will not enjoin a former employee from
receiving business from the customers of his former employer, even though the circumstances be such that he could
be prohibited from soliciting such business.
[7] !d.-Trade Secrets.-Even in the absence of solicitation, an
employer is entitled to protection against his employee's use,
or disclosure in competition with him, of trade secrets given
to the employee only for the purpose of carrying on the employer's business.
[8] !d.-Soliciting Customers of Former Employer.-Equity will
not enjoin solicitation of former employer's customers where
there is no evidence that the former employee sought out preferred customers or that there are such customers in the trade,
where accounts are sold on the open market at flat rates without regard to either their duration or profitableness, where the
[1] Injunction against employee's solicitation of customers,
notes, 23 A.L.R. 423; 126 A.L.R. 758. See, also, Cal.Jur., Injunctions, § 17; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 108.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions,§ 25; [2] Constitutional
Law, § 120; [3-5] Words and Phrases; [6-11] Injunctions, § 25;
[12] Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 32.
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business is highly competitive and patronage depends on
efficiency of service rather than personal relationship, and
where contracts are of brief duration and cancellations are
frequent.
[9] !d.-Trade Secrets.-Rule that equitable protection may be
invoked against subsequent use by a former employee of
knowledge of the peculiar likes, fancies and other characteristics of former employer's customers in case such knowledge
will aid him in securing and retaining their business applies
where friendly contact with customers is important to solicitors, but not where superiority of product or service, rather
than personal relationships or a secret specialty, is the basis
for patronage.
[10] !d.--Trade Secrets.-Matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by
one as his secret.
[11] !d.-Trade Secrets.-Evidence merely showing that building maintenance company utilized a highly efficient system
designed to meet competition and avoid losses, but failing
to show that the method of making estimates was secret or
that former employee was informed of any claim of secrecy,
is insufficient to prove a trade secret.
[12] Trademarks and Unfair Competition-Evidence.-Evidence
is insufficient to sustain finding that former employee of
building maintenance company intended to use its confidential
cost data in unfair competition with its janitorial business
where the records in his possession could have no value to
him unless he desired to do janitorial work for less than
the company's contract prices for the same service, and where,
in the only two transactions shown in which he submitted
bids to the company's customers, his estimates were higher
than the amounts which it was receiving.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Harold B. Jeffery, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages resulting from acts of unfi:tir competition and for an injunction. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
A. V. Falcone and Arthur J. Manley for Appellant.
Victor S. Cogen for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-For about three years, James A. West was
employed by Aetna Building Maintenance Company, Inc., as
a salesman and supervisor. After he left that employment
and engaged in the same business, Aetna sued him for dam-
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ages assertedly resulting from unfair competition. A second
cause of action was based upon a written contract which
included an agreement by West to pay liquidated damages
of $1,000 in the event that he failed to carry out its provisions.
The appeal is from a judgment in favor of Aetna awarding
it damages and permanently enjoining \7\f est from soliciting
any of its customers.
The complaint alleges that, during his employment, West
became familiar with the details of its business, including
customer lists, the extent and type of service required by its
customers, the use of certain procedures, material and equipment, the net costs of performing service for each customer
and the charges made for it. Aetna claims that with this
information, which, it asserts, constitutes trade secrets, West
solicited some of its customers to transfer their patronage to
him and obtained contracts to do work for them.
The record includes a contract executed by the parties
during the time of West's employment by Aetna. One pro vision of it is that West would not, during his employment and
for a period of two years thereafter, disclose any trade secrets
or business information acquired as an employee. Upon termination of his employment, he promised to surrender all
business records and other property belonging to Aetna. He
also agreed not to "solicit, serve and/or cater to any of the
customers of the Company served by him" as an employee for
a period of two years after termination of his employment.
In the event that he breached any of the terms of the agreement, he promised to pay $1,000 as liquidated damages,
together with any exemplary damages which might be
awarded in an action against him. Aetna retained the right
to restrain the violation of the agreement.
There is evidence showing that West had told three out of
about 50 to 75 establishments with which he had worked for
Aetna that he had gone into business for himself. He notified
one of them of his intentions before leaving Aetna. The other
two were informed of his plans after they learned that he had
left Aetna. He visited one :firm three times without invitation, but "he did not solicit business." Estimates for maintenance service were submitted to two :firms upon their invitations. His estimates were similar to the contracts which these
:firms had entered into with Aetna. In one instance, Aetna's
contract had been cancelled before any negotiations were
begun with West.
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Samuel S. Zagel, president of Aetna, testified that West, as
Aetna's supervisor, had been advised of the price received for
each job and understood the amount of time and material
allotted to it. He taught West how to estimate and sell a job,
and trained him in the technique of window cleaning. The
information given West, he said, was vital to the successful
estimation of a contract in such manner as to avoid loss.
vV est denied that he had received such information and
training at Aetna. He testified that, for about 25 years prior
to joining Aetna, he had worked as a janitor.
According to Joseph K. Zagel, secretary of Aetna, he told
\1\f est, as supervisor, the amount received from each client, the
costs of servicing the account, and the particular requirements of each customer. West was given official records and
also kept personal memoranda concerning the business of the
clients. When he left Aetna's employment, he returned the
office records but not his personal memoranda.
vVest stated that he was not given the amount of the charges
made to the customers of Aetna, nor the cost of doing the
work. However, he was informed of their service requirements. At the time he left Aetna, he returned to it the list
of customers which he had been using. While with Aetna,
he kept a personal memorandum book containing notations
of calls to be made in accordance with Joseph Zagel 's instructions. He did not return this book to Aetna. He admitted
that, as to two of the Aetna customers whom he contacted
after he went into business for himself, he understood the
type of service required because of his experience with them
and his general background of knowledge regarding the work
to be performed. In one instance, he remembered the amount
paid by the client.
The evidence shows that approximately 250,000 business
establishments in Los Angeles County use janitor service.
Aetna has about 200 customers. Maintenance accounts are
sold on the open market, being worth about three times the
monthly billing. Usually the contracts may be cancelled upon
giving a 30- to 60-day notice, and renewals depend upon the
ability of the maintenance company. Generally, a cancellation results from a customer's displeasure with the services
given. Ordinarily, when a customer cancels a contract, he
engages another company or employs janitors. As a result,
Aetna and other companies spend much time and money in
efforts to maintain good will and eradicate any ill feeling,
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even after a contract has been cancelled. Frequently, a
customer who has cancelled his contract renews it.
Upon this evidence, the trial court found that West commenced a competing business and solicited and secured the
maintenance business of three Aetna customers, whose names,
addresses and requirements he learned while employed by
Aetna. These acts were intended to, and did, damage Aetna's
business. Unless restrained, West would .continue to divert
Aetna's customers, to its irreparable damage. Other findings
are that, notwithstanding his claim of coercion, West voluntarily executed the employment agreement, and later violated
its provi~ions, but the court determined that it was too
ambiguous to be enforced.
In accordance with these findings, judgment was entered
against West for $1,467. In addition, he was "permanently
enjoined and restrained from soliciting, diverting, or taking
away, directly or indirectly, any customers of the plaintiff .
. . . and . . . from performing janitorial or window cleaning service for any customer of the plaintiff whom defendant
has persuaded to terminate his contract with plaintiff. . . . ''
He also was restrained from divulging any confidential information pertaining to Aetna's customers.
West attacks the evidence as being insufficient to support
the findings of solicitation and of damages. There are no
trade secrets in the building maintenance business, he asserts,
and the record includes no evidence tending to prove that
he used any trade secrets. In addition, he claims that the
rights and duties of the parties have been determined differently than provided in the employment agreement.
Aetna analyzes the evidence as affording abundant support
for the findings and judgment. In particular, it insists that
the information which West secured from it constitutes trade
secrets.
Neither party has challenged the determination that the
employment agreement is too ambiguous to be enforced. Nor
does either of them rely upon the contract as governing his
rights. The basic question presented by West as ground for
reversal of the judgment is whether the court properly granted
equitable and monetary relief upon the cause of action for a
tort. He argues that the existence of the contract, even though
unenforceable, precludes the court from granting more than
the stated amount of liquidated damages. However, if the
trial court's construction of the contract is correct, as he
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concedes, the agreement is void (Civ. Code, § 1598.) It can
have no effect upon the rights of the parties.
[1] In the absence of an enforceable contract containing
negative covenants to the contrary, equity will not enjoin
a former employee from soliciting business from his former
employer's customers, provided his competition is fairly and
legally conducted. (Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley,
24 Cal.2d 104, 110 [148 P.2d 9]; Rest., Agency, Cal. Annot.,
§ 396.) The question, therefore, is whether West was guilty
of unfair competition in soliciting Aetna's customers.
Considering the charge of solicitation, in the light most
favorable to the findings the most shown by the evidence is
that West informed Aetna's clients of the termination of his
employment and his plans to go into business for himself. He
also eagerly accepted business from Aetna's customers when
it was offered to him. There is no evidence whatever of any
suggestion to an Aetna customer that it cancel Aetna's contract and give him the business. In one instance, he accepted
an invitation to discuss business with a firm having a manufacturing plant and an office building upon the same premises.
He submitted contracts to service both of them. Upon learning that Aetna still serviced the office building and the
customer was satisfied with the work done there, although
not in the plant, he made no further mention of the office
building.
[2] \Vest had the right to advise Aetna's customers that
he was severing his business relations with it and engaging
in business for himself. (Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v.
Moseley, supra.) In Theodore v. Williams, 44 Cal.App. 34,
37 [185 P. 1014], the former employee advertised his new
business association by driving a plainly labeled wagon along
the laundry route which he had served for his former employer
and by inserting announcements in newspapers. The court
held that such activity did not violate an injunction against
soliciting, either directly or indirectly, any business from
customers of his former employer.
[3] "Solicit" is defined as: "To ask for with earnestness,
to make petition to, to endeavor to obtain, to awake or
excite to action, to appeal to, or to invite." ·(Black's Law
Dictionary, 3d ed., p. 1639.) "It implies personal petition
and importunity addressed to a particular individual· to do
some particular thing, . . . . " (Golden & Co. v . .Justice's
Court, 23 Cal.App. 778, 798 [140 P. 49] .) It means: "To
appeal to (for something); to apply to for obtaining some-
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thing ; to ask earnestly; to ask for the purpose of receiving ;
to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading; to entreat,
implore, or importune; to make petition to; to plead for; to
try to obtain." (People v. Phillips, 70 Cal.App.2d 449, 453
[160 P.2d 872] .)
[4] Merely informing customers of one's former employer
of a change of employment, without more, is not solicitation.
[5] Neither does the willingness to discuss business upon
invitation of another party constitute solicitation on the
part of the invitee. ['6] Equity will not enjoin a former
employee from receiving business from the customers of his
former employer, even though the circumstances be such that
he should be prohibited from soliciting such business. (Golden
State Milk Prod. Co. v. Brown, 217 Cal. 570, 571 [20 P.2d
657]; New Method Lat~ndry Co. v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 32
[161 P. 990, Ann.Cas. 1918C 1022]; Foster v. Peters, 47 Cal.
App.2d 204, 206 [117 P.2d 726] .) West was entitled to
accept business from Aetna's former customers and such
acceptance, by itself, did not constitute solicitation.
[7] However, even in the absence of solicitation, Aetna is
entitled to protection against West's use, or disclosure in
competition with it, of trade secrets given to him only for
the purpose of carrying on his employer's business. (Reiss v.
Sanford, 47 Cal.App.2d 244, 246-247 [117 P.2d 694]; Germo
Mfg. Co. v. McClellan, 107 Cal.App. 532, 541 [290 P. 534];
Lab. Code, § 2860; Rest., Agency, § 396 (b) ; see cases collected in165 A.L.R. 1453.) West takes the position that there
are no trade secrets in the building maintenance business and
there is no evidence of his use of a trade secret. Aetna, on
the other hand, argues that its customer lists, knowledge of
the requirements of various customers, the use of certain
procedures, material and equipment, and its cost records are
trade secrets. The evidence, it says, was sufficient to support
the finding that West secured these secrets as its employee
and wrongfully used them in competition with it.
[8] The facts of this case do not justify the application
of principles governing the rights of the parties in connection
with retail delivery routes. Under such circumstances, as
stated in George v. Bttrdusis, 21 Cal.2d 153, 159 [130 P.2d
399], and other decisions, to obtain relief against a former
employee it must be shown: (1) The information was confidential and not readily accessible to competitors; (2) The
former employee solicited the customers of his former employer
with intent to injure him; ( 3) The former employee sought
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out certain preferred customers whose trade is particularly
profitable and whose identities are not generally known to
the trade; ( 4) The business is such that a customer will ordinarily patronize only one concern ; ( 5) The established business relationship between the customer and the former employer would normally continue unless interiered with. (California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal.App.2d
197, 202 [188 P.2d 303], and cases there cited.)
These factors are here absent. Prospective customers are
commonly known to the trade or may easily be discovered
through business directories or by observation. (Avocado
Bales Co. v. Wyse, 122 Cal.App. 627, 634 [10 P.2d 485] .)
There is no evidence that West sought out preferred customers.
In any event, the evidence produced by Aetna is to the effect
that there are no preferred customers in the trade. Accounts
are sold upon the open market at fiat rates without regard
to either their duration or profitableness. The evidence shows
that the business is highly competitive and patronage depends
upon efficiency of service rather than personal relationship.
Contracts are of brief duration and cancellations are frequent.
Under such trade conditions, equity will not enjoin the solicitation of the former employer's customers. (Continental CarNa-Var Corp. v. Moseley, supra, p. 111.)
[9] Equitable protection may be invoked against the
subsequent use by a former employee of knowledge of the
''peculiar likes and fancies and other characteristics'' of the
former employer's customers where such knowledge will aid
him in securing and retaining their business. (George v.
Burdttsis,, sttpra, p. 160; Dairy Dale Co. v. Azevedo, 211 Cal.
344, 345 [295 P. 10] ; Pasadena Ice Co. v. Reeder, 206 Cal. 697,
704 [275 P. 944, 276 P. 995] .) This rule applies where
friendly contact with customers is important to solicitors, a
circumstance typical of the so-called "trade route" cases. It
has also been applied to situations involving a knowledge of
the customer's desire for specialized information, his preference for certain products, and his buying habits. (California
Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, supra, p. 204; Wallick
v. Koren, SO Cal.App.2d 223, 227 [181 P.2d 682] .) However, where, as here, superiority of product or service, rather
than personal relationships or a secret specialty, is the basis for
patronage, a knowledge 'of the customer's requirements is not
sufficient reason for an injunction. (Continental Car-Na-V ar
Corp. v. Moseley, supra, p. 111; DeLuxe Box Lunch &; Catering Co. v. Black, 86 Cal.App.2d 434, 441 [194 P.2d 715].)
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Under circumstane0s of open eompetition, sueh knowledge is
readily available to all in the trade.
Insofar as methods of janitorial service are eoncerned, the
evidenee shows no trade seeret. An instruetor of building
maintenance testified to the standard teehniques and procedure
which he taught both in the public schools and to Aetna
employees. [10] "Matters of public knowledge or of general
knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as
his secret." (Rest., Torts,§ 757, com. b.) [11] No evidence
was introduced which tended to prove that Aetna used any
unusual or secret material or equipment. On the contrary,
the evidenee shows that it regularly tested products of general
use in the trade to determine which best suited its purposes.
According to Aetna, its procedure for estimating the price
of a new eontract, was a trade secret. However, no evidence
was introduced tending to prove that Aetna had developed
a secret, or even improved, system of making estimates. The
very most whieh is shown by the evidence is that Aetna utilized
a highly efficient system designed to meet competition and
avoid losses. Of necessity, any competitior in the business
must consider all of the factors which entered into Aetna's
computations. There is a total absence of any showing that
the method of making estimates are secret, or that West was
informed of any claim of secrecy. Under these conditions,
West was privileged to use ''methods of doing business and
processes which are but skillful variations of general processes
known to the particular trade.'' (Rest., Agency, § 396,
com. b.)
The evidence upon the question of whether West had
access to Aetna's cost records is conflicting. The· trier of
fact could have believed that 'West, during his employment,
acquired knowledge of costs of doing business and took it
with him. However, assuming, without deciding, that this
information was secret, there is no evidence tending to show
that he made unfair use of it in competing with Aetna, or
intends to do so.
[12] The evidence clearly shows that the janitorial business does not depend upon patrons whose work can be done
at an exceptionally low cost. Under these circumstances, the
records in West's possession could have no value to him unless
he desired to do janitorial work for less than Aetna's contract
prices for the same service. But in the only two transactions
shown in evidence where \¥est submitted bids to Aetna's
customers, his estimates were higher than the amounts which
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Aetna was receiving. He charged five dollars more for identical service in one case. On the other bid, he offered janitorial
service only for $13.50 less than Aetna charged for both
janitor and window cleaning service. Such evidence is insufficient to support the finding that West used and intended
to use Aetna's confidential cost data in unfair competition
with H.
'l'he judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., 'l'raynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
There is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
finding that defendant West obtained from plaintiff trade
secrets which he used in soliciting its customers.
In regard to the solicitation, the evidence shows that defendant West advised three customers of plaintiff that he had
severed his relation as an employee of plaintiff and had gone
into business for himself. Obviously, that statement was
made for the purpose of obtaining their patronage at plaintiff's
expense. There is ample evidence to justify an inference
which the trial court could draw to this effect. There is
nothing in Cont1:nental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal.
2d104 [148 P.2d 9], to the contrary. The court there merely
said that an ex-employee may send out a form letter that he
is engaging in business for himself. That does not mean,
that under any circumstances, personally advising the former
employer's customers of the severance of his relations and
that he is engaging in the same business will not support an
inference that he actually asked the customers for their
patronage. Here defendant personally so advised the customers and gave them his business card. He made such a
call on three occasions on one of the customers. He took
proposed contracts to another which were practically identical
with those used by plaintiff with which he was familiar. In
addition, plaintiff's officers called him on the telephone after
he had contacted the customers and charged him with having
violated his contract by soliciting its customers. Defendant
did not deny the solicitation. He merely replied that he had
a right to and was going ahead to make a living. Such a
failure to deny solicitation constituted an admission of it by
an adoption of the accusatory statement. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1870[3]; 10 Cal.Jur., 1070 et seq.)
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In regard to the nature of the information obtained by
defendant in his employment as being a protectible interest,
the evidence is adequate to support the finding on this issue.
The parties entered into an employment agreement and it
was signed by defendant. Although it was void for uncertainty, nevertheless, it contained statements that constituted
admissions by defendant. It is recited therein that the parties
aclmowledged that the ''good will, continued patronage and
the list of names and addresses of its customers and their
special requirements constitute the principal asset of the
Company." Further that defendant in his employment "has
become or will become acquainted with many of the said
customers, their names, addresses, and special requirements,
and will become acquainted with other and future customers
and with the other confidential matters of the Company's
business.'' In addition to that the evidence shows that
plaintiff's contracts or accounts with its customers were not
for merely one order or successive independent orders. They
ran for a period of time. The character of the service was
such that a customer would not be contracting with more
than one supplier at the same time, as he might well do if
only the purchase of supplies or products for resale were
involved. The accounts had a definite marketable value which
was in excess of the amount called for on the face of the contract, the increased value being predicated on the prospects
of renewal contracts in the future. Defendant was a supervisor for plaintiff, and in that capacity, he obtained the lists
of customers, made personal contact with them, considered
their complaints concerning the service and endeavored to
eliminate the cause for complaint. He learned from plaintiff
the exact method of computing the cost of furnishing the
service and the actual cost of jobs he later solicited, and the
peculiarities and special requirements of the various customers.
These factors bring the case squarely within the rule that
customer lists are protected even though they may be obtain"
able where each customer may be differentiated from the
other in the nature of his requirements and the value of his
patronage to the former employer. The rule is thus stated:
''There is no merit in this assertion (that the customer lists
were not secret), since obviously it is not merely the knowledge
of the identity of the customers, but the friendly contact with
them which is important to the solicitors : '. . . they became
personally acquainted with the customers of the respondent,
their respective places of residence, their peculiar likes and
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fancies and other characteristcs, a knowledge of which would
greatly aid them in securing and retaining the business of
said former customers.' " (Dairy Dale Co. v. Azevedo, 211
Cal. 344, 345 [295 P. 10].) In Scavengers P. Assn. v. Serv-UGarbage Co., 218 Cal. 568 [24 P.2d 489], the issue was
whether a former employee of a corporation engaged in the
garbage collection business could be prevented from soliciting
customers of his former employer. This court held that he
could, stressing the fact that some of the customers were
preferred because they discarded material that could be
salvaged and sold as junk. This is similar to the nature of
the conditions, the premises of the persons desiring janitorial
service, varying with each customer. As in that case, the
case at bar involves customers who could be found from
directories, as nearly everyone had garbage disposal service,
but each customer had his peculiarities.
The trial court had adequate justification for concluding
that defendant employee had acquired the names of his
employer's customers, the particular needs of each, what each
complained of in respect to the service supplied by plaintiff,
the idiosyncrasies of each, the particular needs for each job
and the itemized cost thereof from actual experience while
in the employ of plaintiff. Clearly the trier of fact could ·
infer that pleasing a person with cleaning service depends
largely upon the person's personal opinion and taste of what
constitutes a satisfactory job. By his contacts, and as the
recipient of complaints, defendant was in a position peculiarly
adapted to gaining such information. Assuming, as does
the majority, that the quality of the service was a major
factor in obtaining and keeping accounts, yet the holder of the
yardstick is the person to whom the service is furnished and
whose opinion may vary from other persons and each of
the latter may vary as to each other. Defendant acquired
that knowledge in the course of his employment and information which was more than a part of his learning of the work
generally. Having acquired that knowledge and information
while in the employ of plaintiff, he sought to apply it to
plaintiff's detriment by inducing plaintiff's customers to forsake plaintiff and employ him to do that which plaintiff had
apparently blilen doing to the mntnal benefit and satisfaction
of plaintiff and its customers before defendant interfered.
I am in full accord with the views expressed in the opinion
prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice Moore and concurred in
by Mr. Justice McComb when this case was before the District
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Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two,
(Cal.App.) 236 P.2d 390.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 31,
1952. Shenk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

[S. F. No. 18261. In Bank.

July 8, 1952.]

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, INC. ( a Corporation), Appellant, v. WALTER S. VAN WINKLE, Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Judgments Appealable-Part of Judgment.-There
may be an appeal from a part of a judgment only if that part
is severable.
[2] !d.-Review on Appeal from Part of Judgment.-Where portions of a judgment are truly severable, the appellate court
is without jurisdiction to consider the parts from which no
appeal has been taken, and will consider the portion before it
independently of the other parts.
[3] !d.-Effect of Modification or ReversaL-Modification or reversal of the portion of the judgment from which an appeal
has been taken has no effect on the other portions.
[4] !d.-Review on Appeal from Part of Judgment.-The test of
whether a portion of a judgment appealed from is so interwoven with its other provisions as to preclude an independent
examination of the part challenged by appellant is whether
the matters or issues embraced arc the same as, or interdependent on, the matters which have not been attacked.
[5] !d.-Review on Appeal from Part of Judgment.-In action for
declaration of rights under a lease giving lessor the right to

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 535; Am.Jur., Appeal
and Error, § 822.
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